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CHAPTER 9
Evidence Use and the Institutions 
of the State: The Role of Parliament 
and the Judiciary
Stefanie Ettelt
IntroductIon
Most analyses of the role of scientific evidence in health policy see health 
system governance as predominantly the responsibility of the Government, 
with the Ministry of Health being its main representative. The World 
Health Organization (WHO), for example, emphasised the steering role 
of ministries in improving health and health system performance (Travis 
et al. 2002). Yet what is sometimes overlooked is that ministries operate in 
context, with other state institutions interacting and shaping its role. The 
Ministry of Health may be the main actor responsible for health within the 
executive, but it operates within a larger institutional context, i.e. the 
‘political system’. This definition by Scott and Mcloughlin emphasises the 
interaction of formal and informal institutions that shape the plethora of 
political processes, roles and responsibilities that together form the state:
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Political systems are the formal and informal political processes by which 
decisions are made concerning the use, production and distribution of 
resources in any given society. Formal political institutions can determine 
the process for electing leaders; the roles and responsibilities of the executive 
and legislature; the organisation of political representation (through politi-
cal parties); and the accountability and oversight of the state. Informal and 
customary political systems, norms and rules can operate within or alongside 
these formal political institutions. (Scott and Mcloughlin 2014: n.p.)
This chapter examines the role of two of the institutions of the state 
that influence health policymaking and health system governance in addi-
tion to government. With health policy we mean all national or sub- 
national policies that have an intentional bearing on population health and 
health care provision; health system governance refers to the steering of 
the health system with all its components. These definitions overlap, as 
they should, but as not all health policies relate to health system gover-
nance and not all governance decisions may be considered policies.
The chapter concentrates on the legislature and the judiciary, which are 
typically anchored in constitutional law (the United Kingdom is the exam-
ple in which constitutional rules are in existence but are “unwritten”). 
Therefore, this chapter will examine the role of (1) parliaments in making 
legislation and scrutinising the actions of government, and (2) the legal 
system, forming the judiciary and its role in arbitrating conflicts between 
policy actors and in scrutinising the compatibility of decisions by govern-
ment and parliament with existing law.
Understanding the role of the legislative and judiciary is important to 
contextualise the role of health ministries analysed in earlier chapters and 
their approach to making use of research evidence to inform decisions. 
The chapter takes the observation as a starting point that other bodies of 
‘the state’ are often involved in the policy process and should therefore be 
considered relevant when we analyse the role of scientific evidence in 
health policymaking. Yet the constellation of these bodies varies between 
countries as they reflect differences in political systems, which translates 
into significant differences in how health policymaking and health system 
governance are influenced by them.
The chapter does not attempt to cover all bodies of the state relevant to 
health policy or all aspects of each country’s political system. Instead, it 
aims to provide a broad overview by extracting relevant examples from the 
case studies of the GRIP-Health project and reflect on similarities and 
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differences between them. There are few empirical studies of how evi-
dence from research is incorporated in decision making processes within 
parliaments and courts (two of them included in this book), or if there are 
any, they are dispersed between different academic disciplines and not fully 
explored from the perspective of evidence-based policy-making. This 
chapter wants to highlight this gap by drawing attention to the relevance 
of legislators and courts in using evidence to exercise their mandate. It 
primarily does so by exploring the use of evidence in relation to their func-
tion of holding government to account, which has the benefit of allowing 
us to reflect on the checks and balances on governmental power and the 
limits of its decision- making relating to health policy.
InstItutIons of the state and theIr role In usIng 
evIdence for health PolIcy-MakIng
It is sometimes assumed that health policymaking largely takes place in 
central government, with ministries of health being the only state actors. 
Indeed, the WHO, highlighting the need for stewardship in health system 
governance, largely called on ministries of health to become responsible 
‘stewards’ in driving health policy development and system reform (Travis 
et al. 2002). There are multiple critiques of this assumption, for example, 
with regard to countries in which responsibility for health are shared 
between different levels of government (Ettelt et al. 2010). This exists in 
many forms, for example in federalist countries in which responsibility for 
health policy is shared by different levels of government (Banting and 
Corbett 2001). But even among countries that are not federalist in the 
sense that they consist of a federation of states with separate state govern-
ments and parliaments, there is much variation with regard to the distribu-
tion of responsibility for health and the health system (Saltman et  al. 
2007). The United Kingdom with its four countries – England, Scotland, 
Wales and the Northern Ireland – is a case in point, as each country has its 
own health department and National Health Service, with only a few 
functions (e.g. emergency response) being centralised.
In addition, in many countries the decision-making power for health 
policymaking is also diffused among the institutions of the state, especially 
parliament and the judiciary. This particularly emphasises the role of 
national law, both in terms of making and in interpreting legislation, in 
health policy-making and system governance. The countries selected for 
this study cover different political regime types (ranging from democratic 
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to non-democratic) and different constitutional structures (e.g. unitary vs. 
federal states; degree of executive control) (Ettelt et al. 2016). The com-
parison of political systems of the six countries selected for this study high-
lights three important differences:
• First, in some countries, the health policy and system governance 
function is highly centralised with the ministry of health being the 
main, and sometimes only player, with parliament and the judiciary 
being less influential. Ethiopia, Cambodia and Ghana broadly fall 
into this category for reasons that include both constitutional separa-
tion of power and practices of collaborative deliberation. In Ghana, 
for instance, in theory, parliament should approve the sectoral bud-
gets for any financial year and coordinate its decision with the 
Ministry of Health responsible for the internal evaluation of the per-
formance of the health system and its policies. Yet coordination does 
not happen in practice; while both processes tend to happen simulta-
neously, there is little overlap of the personnel involved in each and 
hence the coordination between both processes is limited. In 
Germany, in contrast, health system governance is almost entirely 
devolved to corporatist actors operating within a legal framework 
developed by the Federal Parliament, with the Federal Ministry of 
Health being only responsible for a relatively narrowly defined set of 
policy decisions and accountability functions (Ettelt et al. 2010).
• The second difference relates to the role of parliament in making 
health policy decisions and in scrutinising government actions in rela-
tion to policy development and health system governance. While par-
liament has some role in health policymaking in most countries, by 
way of debating, developing and eventually passing legislation, there 
are substantial differences in the extent to which parliament uses its 
powers to scrutinize government policy both ex ante and ex post, and 
the extent this scrutiny involves questioning the type of knowledge 
used to inform its decisions including scientific evidence.
• A third difference relates to the role of the judiciary in health policy and 
health system governance. Colombia and Germany stand out among 
the selected countries in this respect as in both countries the judiciary 
has a strong role in challenging the decisions of government and other 
health policy actors (e.g. the corporatist self-administration). The right 
to challenge these decisions in the courts is inscribed in constitutional 
law, which define both the balance of power within the state and the 
scope for action by citizens and others (e.g. provider organisations, 
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insurers, corporatist actors) to defend their rights in case of violation. In 
other countries, in contrast, the judiciary is more restrained in interven-
ing in government decisions either because of customary authority 
given to the government (in England) or because the judiciary is 
not sufficiently independent from those ruling in government (in 
Cambodia).
In the following two sections the role of the legislature and the judi-
ciary and  their potential for evidence use will be investigated in more 
detail, starting with the role of parliaments.
legIslatures: the role of ParlIaMents
Given their constitutional role, parliaments should have a major influence 
on evidence use in health system governance and health policies. However, 
whether this happens in practice is an empirical question and this question 
has not yet been much researched.
In principle, there are (at least) two roles for parliament that can create 
opportunities for evidence use. The first role is to develop legislation and 
to set the legislative framework for health system governance. This includes 
initiating major health care reform (e.g. setting up the current system of 
health care financing in Colombia), but can also involve a broad spectrum 
of legislation that applies to any aspect of health care financing and deliv-
ery, health promotion, and preventative and public health measures (as 
discussed e.g. in the chapter on Ghana). Such decisions would warrant 
good information, hence there is a potential role for research evidence to 
influence these processes (constituting some form of ‘instrumental’ use).
The second role is for parliament to hold government to account for its 
decisions and actions. This can include both the use of scientific studies as a 
means to exercise accountability (e.g. evaluation of government policies or 
analyses of health system monitoring data) and the requirement of govern-
ment and its constituent parts to demonstrate that decisions are well founded, 
which may include considerations of supporting evidence from research.
The analysis of the countries selected in this book suggests that there is 
great variation in the role of parliament in using, and enforcing, evidence 
use in health policymaking. Crucially, parliaments vary in their involve-
ment in health policymaking, but also in the extent to which they hold 
government to account. In some countries, as outlined above, health poli-
cymaking and health system governance are mostly the domain of the 
 EVIDENCE USE AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE: THE ROLE… 
190 
executive with parliamentary involvement and oversight being limited or 
non-existent (Newman et al. 2013). In other countries, parliaments decide 
on a wide range of health policies and health system governance issues. As 
an example, Parliaments in England and Ghana both approve the budget 
allocation for health care. The Federal Parliament in Germany (composed 
of the Federal Assembly (Bundestag) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat)), 
in contrast, does not have authority over the budget, as this is held jointly 
by sickness funds as funds are collected through a social insurance system. 
Yet in Germany, the Federal Parliament plays a crucial role in setting, and 
monitoring, contribution rates to social health insurance thus influencing 
the ability of sickness funds to increase the budget significantly.
The analysis of the country case studies suggests that there is great 
variation as to the role of parliament in using, and enforcing, evidence use 
in health policymaking. Overall the verdict is not positive. In our study, 
examples of parliaments or parliamentarians engaging with research and 
opportunities for using evidence to come to better informed decisions 
were few and far between, particular with regard to informing legislative 
decisions. The analysis of minimum volumes policy in Germany (aimed at 
improving outcomes of complex interventions in hospitals) is a case in 
point. Parliament seemed not to have engaged with any evidence, despite 
the fact that the policy proposal was inspired by findings from health ser-
vices research. Yet the scientific evidence base for minimum volumes 
became a major cause of disagreement at later stages of the policy process, 
including in the courts. In Germany, both chambers of Parliament are 
supported by an in-house scientific service, but its role is largely invisible 
to the public (it briefly surfaced in a recent scandal where a minister had 
used the service to co-write his PhD (Blechschmidt et al. 2011)). A recent 
study on the role of research in the UK Parliament, conducted by research-
ers of the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, concluded that 
almost all Members of Parliament and their staff participating in the sur-
vey (83 out of a total of 85) found research evidence useful for their work. 
However, most respondents applied a wide definition of what they meant 
by ‘research’ and ‘evidence’, including scientific research as well as other 
forms of research and knowledge (Kenny et al. 2017).
Countries also vary in whether health policy is mostly made through 
legislation, like in Germany and Colombia, or whether decisions relating to 
health policy and health system governance are mostly made through gov-
ernment decree and secondary legislation. Colombia’s bicameral Parliament 
(the Congress) plays a substantial role in health system  governance as most 
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aspects of health policy are based on primary legislation (although there is 
also the possibility of a presidential decree). When the current system of 
health care financing was created through ‘Law 100’ in 1993 it was 
expected that much of the detailed principles that are required for its full 
implementation would be developed by subsequent legislatures. However, 
this has proven to be a slow process with the Congress having difficulties in 
forming sustainable majorities to make substantial decisions over a longer 
period of time as required for the implementation of Law 100.
Weyrauch et al. (2016) note that political parties can play a prominent 
role in channelling scientific evidence to inform legislation. However, in 
Colombia, to stay with the example, Parliament has a reputation for being 
fragmented and its members tend not to vote along party lines. Political 
parties are deemed weak and “lack[ing] the coherence and stability needed 
to effectively make policy” (Pachón and Johnson 2016: 73). This ten-
dency to fragmentation in consequence allows the Government to exercise 
power over Parliament and orchestrate legislative action. Pachon and 
Johnson (2016) note that bills brought forward by the Government have 
a much higher chance to be turned into legislation than bills promoted by 
members of parliament, suggesting that the Government has substantial 
influence over the legislative process, for example by influencing the selec-
tion of chairs and rapporteurs on parliamentary committees.
In our case study on Colombia, Alvarez-Rosete and Hawkins (in this 
book) demonstrate that legislation is often justified by reference to scien-
tific evidence and it is possible that committees engage with studies relat-
ing to relevant topics. However, it is difficult to see what incentives 
members of parliament might have to use evidence or scrutinise the 
Government’s use of evidence. Dargent (2015) also noted that, in 
Colombia, Ministry of Health officials hold most technical expertise and 
have often play a pivotal role in informing the development of health leg-
islation, again tipping the balance in favour of government.
One condition for parliaments to exercise their function to oversee gov-
ernments is that the legislature has a degree of independence from the 
executive. Arguably, this is inherently difficult in parliamentary systems in 
which the executive is formed by majority holders elected into parliament. 
However, the question is whether parliament is sufficiently separate from 
government so that members of parliament see it as their collective respon-
sibility to hold their government to account. If this is not the case, for 
example where both government and parliament are dominated by the 
same group of people (as in Cambodia), it is unlikely that parliament is in 
a position to review and challenge government actions.
 EVIDENCE USE AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE: THE ROLE… 
192 
Parliaments can also be limited in their capacity to scrutinise proposals 
from the executive, which produces the vast amount of legislative initia-
tives. In Ghana, the Select Committee on Health can initiate inquiries on 
health policy matters to hold the Government to account, but its efforts 
are constrained by its limited budgetary and professional capacity.
Lindberg (2010) notes that Parliamentary scrutiny of government pol-
icy in Ghana was high in the years 1997–2000 (the second presidential 
term of Jerry John Rawlings in the Fourth Republic), with subsequent 
parliaments being less active in challenging government action. The prob-
lem Lindberg diagnoses is that members of parliament are themselves not 
held to account by their constituents for their role in scrutinising govern-
ment, but are rewarded, and kept in post, for their ability to secure 
resources for local projects and investments. Access to such resources is 
controlled by the Government which therefore can reward (or penalise) 
members of parliament for their support (or the lack of it) for government 
decisions. Mechanisms such as questions to the Government from the 
floor are possible, but they are more likely to be used to inquire about 
progress in the implementation of local projects than about policies rele-
vant to the populace as a whole (Lindberg 2010). With the accountability 
function being ineffective, the ability of parliament – while democratically 
elected and thriving in this respect – to scrutinise government is weak. 
This weakness is compounded by a lack of resources and capacity of par-
liamentary services.
The importance of accountability mechanisms for evidence use is also 
highlighted by the role of the Parliament (composed of the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords) in the UK. The UK Parliament passes 
primary legislation relating to health, which provides the framework for 
the National Health Service (NHS), public health and other health-related 
policies. It also scrutinises health policy that the Government develops and 
implements via secondary legislation through its Department of Health. A 
number of mechanisms are available for this purpose, including parliamen-
tary debates, and questions put to ministers, the department and posed 
directly to the Prime Minister. Evidence from research may play a part in 
these mechanisms (Kenny et al. 2017), yet its use is highly variable, topic 
dependent and often superseded by debates about the worthiness of policy 
goals in the first place. The debate about the controversial 2012 health 
care reform is a case in point, in which Members of Parliament challenged 
the intention of the Government to privatise the NHS much more force-
fully than they demanded the existence of any studies in support of the 
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proposal for large-scale restructuring and the strengthening of provider 
competition (Timmins 2012). The Government was criticised for not 
using evidence, but this critique came from actors outside the legislature, 
such as policy think tanks (IoG 2012).
Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords are supported in 
their work by research and library services, however, the extent to which 
these information services are used and are seen as relevant by members is 
highly variable. In contrast, scientific evidence is often central in the work 
of the Health Select Committee. In the 2015–17 Parliamentary term, the 
Committee conducted 24 inquiries on topics as wide ranging as the state of 
the NHS finances, the Government’s actions on suicide prevention, the 
effects of Brexit on health and social care services, and the state of public 
health after the restructuring of the sector in 2013. The Committee invites 
public sector and civil society organisations to make submissions for a topic, 
which are often bolstered by substantial references to studies. It also invites 
a broad range of experts, including researchers, to give evidence before the 
committee. After deliberating the evidence from all sources (scientific or 
not), the committee publishes its verdict in a report available from its web-
site (e.g. HoC 2016). However, the extent to which UK Select Committees 
are able to hold the Government to account is debated. King and Crewe 
(2013: 355), in their book “The blunders of our Governments”, argue that 
such committees “seldom seek to delve deeply into the origins of policies 
as distinct from their merits and generally fight shy of addressing issues that 
already are, or might become, issues of partisan controversy”.
the JudIcIary: the role of courts
The judiciary – often referred to as the third power of the state – applies 
and interprets the law of a country in the name of the state. Countries vary 
in whether the judiciary can have a role in developing legislation, either 
through commenting, or even approving, proposed bills or through set-
ting precedence that informs future decisions of courts.
This function is represented, for example, by the Constitutional Court 
in Colombia, which has authority, as per the Colombian constitution, to 
review legislation passed by the Congress if the bill affects constitutional 
rights (Hernández Álvarez 2013). The Constitutional Court can also 
decide to step in if it finds that legislative and executive bodies have failed 
to act. This has created a dynamic in which political actors tend to defer to 
the Court for resolution on contested issues that they are unable to resolve 
by other means.
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The judiciary can also have a role in holding the government and parlia-
ment to account, for example through the mechanisms of constitutional 
complaint or judicial review. In Germany, the Federal Government and 
Parliament tend to consult senior judges at the German Constitutional 
Court on policies that affect constitutional rights to avoid a retrospective 
“complaint of unconstitutionality” (Verfassungsklage) that can result in 
legislation being revoked and returned to legislators (Landfried 1994). 
There is no suggestion that courts are particularly interested or indeed 
equipped to advise other state bodies about matters of scientific evidence, 
as advice will be focused on aspects of legality and couched in legal terms 
only. However, depending on the issue in question it is possible that stud-
ies play a role in legal argumentation in case of review (as demonstrated in 
the chapter on minimum volumes in this book).
However, it is not a given that courts are in a position to challenge 
governments as this (as with parliament) requires a good degree of inde-
pendence between the executive and the judiciary. Courts can also arbi-
trate in conflicts between individuals and organisations, often using a 
broad spectrum of law that has a bearing on health and health policy (e.g. 
medical law; social law; criminal law, administrative law). In some coun-
tries, courts play a prominent role in arbitrating access to care decisions, 
especially those that provide a constitutional right to health or health care 
(e.g. Colombia, Germany). These decisions typically cut across litigation 
on behalf of individuals (i.e. patients, members of sickness funds) and the 
politico-administrative system mandated with making decisions about col-
lective health service coverage (for example through bodies such as the 
National Institute For Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in England or 
the Institute for Health Technology Assessment (IETS) in Colombia).
Such litigation is widespread in Colombia, where a constitutional right 
to health provides the legal basis for patients to challenge decisions by 
insurers if these deny funding treatments. Between 1999 and 2014 over 
1.3 million right-to-health cases were brought to the Constitutional Court 
(Defensoría del Pueblo 2015). Such court cases draw on the legal instru-
ment of ‘tutelas’ which are “informal and expedite injunctions that allow 
citizens to seek judicial protection when their basic rights are threatened 
by the state or by a third party” (Lamprea 2014: 133). The court  therefore 
has the power to reverse a decision made by insurers, both public and 
private, as well as decisions made by IETS, even if these decisions have 
been based on rigorous health technology assessment. This is problematic, 
as the right to health is interpreted in a way that allows individuals to have 
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access to (government-funded) treatment even if this treatment is proven 
to be ineffective or excessively costly.
Pharmaceutical companies have latched on this opportunity and have 
made a business model of providing legal support to patients to gain addi-
tional funding. However, while the behaviour of the court has been 
decried as inappropriately interventionist, it has also been argued that this 
is the only route that patients can take to challenge the decisions of insur-
ers. The argument is that the Ministry of Health has been unable to effec-
tively regulate and police the behaviour of insurers and the price setting of 
pharmaceutical companies that both could help to ease pressure on courts. 
Lamprea (2014: 158) therefore suggests that the Constitutional Court in 
Colombia acts like the proverbial “canary in the coal mine that signals 
deeper institutional dysfunctions within Colombia’s health sector”.
Courts in Germany have a prominent role in access to treatment deci-
sions, but in contrast to Colombia most cases are dealt with by Social 
Courts (i.e. a system of courts concerned with social security matters) 
rather than the Federal Constitutional Court. In 2005, the Constitutional 
Court laid down rules for applying the constitutional ‘right to life’ included 
in the German Basic Law (which expands to a right to health care). This 
decision provides the basis for the decisions of all courts to which these 
rules apply, forcing sickness funds to reimburse treatment, including in 
cases in which evidence of effectiveness was absent or highly questionable 
(Ettelt  in press). However, compared with Colombia, the caseload in 
Germany is relatively modest, with less than 400 cases between 2005 and 
the end of 2015 (RUB 2016).
In contrast, courts play a much more limited role in treatment decisions 
in England, where no constitutional right to health exists. Since the incep-
tion of NICE, there have been less than a handful of cases in which NHS 
patients sought legal redress against decisions by NICE to withhold (or, 
more precisely, not mandate local NHS organisations to provide) treat-
ment in the NHS. Littlejohns et al. (2012) noted that there is only a nar-
rowly defined set of reasons that patients can employ to take NICE, or any 
Government agency, to court. These reasons are that NICE has exceeded 
its mandate (defined by Parliament and the Secretary of State for Health), 
that the institute acted unfairly or that the decision cannot be ‘reasonably’ 
justified, all of which can be refuted by reference to mandate and proce-
dure, which can include reference to appropriate use to scientific evidence 
(also Syrett 2010).
 EVIDENCE USE AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE: THE ROLE… 
196 
However, more recently, there were a number of cases of patients who 
took NHS England (the central governance body overseeing the NHS) to 
court for rejecting applications for treatment funding. In May 2016, the 
High Court ordered NHS England to provide a teenager with narcolepsy 
with the requested drug at least for three months, in spite of NHS England 
not considering the drug as sufficiently cost-effective (HSJ 2016). The 
court ruled that the case met the criteria of “exceptionality” and judged 
that the reasoning of NHS England was “unsupportable”. Yet such legal 
challenges to treatment decisions of NHS governing bodies that are effec-
tively government agencies are considered unusual and undesirable, as it is 
argued that courts should not become involved in decisions about resource 
allocation. Such decisions should be made by government and related 
administrative bodies (Ford and Tracy 2016).
In interviews, conducted in Cambodia, Ghana and Ethiopia the judiciary 
was not mentioned as an institutional actor that impacts on health policy or 
health system governance decisions. This may be a reflection of our inter-
view strategy but it also resonates with our observation of the unstable or 
emerging role of the judiciary in these countries and/or a lack of judicial 
independence that does not allow courts to challenge the  government. 
Cambodia, for example, only begun (re-)building its judicial system after 
democratisation in 1993 following several decades with no legal system in 
place. However, the judiciary is institutionally weak and dominated by the 
interests of the ruling elite which also dominate the executive and legislature 
(Dressel 2014; McCarthy and Un 2015). There is therefore no mechanism 
through which the judiciary could hold the government to account (with 
the trial against former Khmer Rouge leaders being a potential exception) 
and courts are unlikely to be involved in health policy decisions.
the InstItutIons of the state Matter for the study 
of evIdence use In health PolIcy 
and health systeM governance
This chapter has discussed a number of examples from our programme of 
work that illustrate how the design and functioning of state institutions can 
shape the accountability mechanism between the government, parliament 
and the judiciary and the different places in which decision-making in rela-
tion to health policy and health system making can happen at the national 
level. While ministries of health are the pivotal (if not only) actors in health 
policymaking, their role is highly dependent on the institutional configura-
tion of the state.
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Our country case studies showed a variety of such constellations, par-
ticularly focusing on parliament (legislature) and courts (judiciary), their 
role in scrutinising government policy and their involvement in decision 
making relating to health policy. While there are few studies specifically 
examining the role of evidence use in decisions in parliaments or the judi-
ciary this chapter wants to shine a spotlight on the fact that these institu-
tions often have a role in health policymaking and health system governance 
which should not be overlooked.
The chapter hints at a number of tensions between decision-making struc-
tures and demands for better use of research evidence in policy-making. 
Parliament provides a key mechanism for holding government to account, 
however, this is not a given and in many situations this is not sufficiently 
exercised. There are many reasons why parliaments can find it difficult to 
hold governments to account, although these are likely to vary greatly. It 
also can be argued that attention of parliament for government activities, in 
health or elsewhere, is likely to be sporadic and incomplete, and depended 
on the interests, qualification and attention span of their members. However, 
in countries in which the parliament (often through committees) uses evi-
dence and demands evidence use from the government, this can provide a 
powerful stimulus for better evidence use throughout the sector.
There are only a few examples of courts being involved in health policy 
decisions within the scope of this book. Examples of court involvement in 
access to treatment decisions in Germany and Colombia show that the rela-
tionship can be complicated with courts likely to give preference to constitu-
tional principles that emphasise individual rights over concerns about 
effectiveness or affordability. However, different judicial practices in different 
countries have brought about a variety of approaches that may or may not 
include an assessment of evidence from studies. Courts can also have a place 
in reviewing Government policies through mechanisms such as judicial review 
or ‘constitutional challenge’, although the effect of evidence use is unclear.
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